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Abstract
We introduce some elements of Prospect Theory into a general equi-
librium model with monopolistic competition in the good market and real
wage rigidities due to (right to manage or efficient) wage bargaining, or
to efficiency wages. We show that, under these types of labor market
frictions, an increase in workers’ loss aversion: (i) reduces the equilibrium
wage and in this way increases potential output; (ii) induces workers to
work and consume less and in this way decreases potential output. If the
former effect is greater (smaller) than the latter one, loss aversion increases
(decreases) potential output. We also show that, under all the types of
labor market frictions we consider, if loss aversion reduces equilibrium
output, it also enhances the plausibility of nominal price rigidities.
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1 Introduction
In a recent contribution, Rabin (2013) proposes to introduce behavioral ele-
ments into mainstream economic models through an approach named PEEMs
(portable extensions of existing models). This approach is based on the mod-
ification of an existing model by means of different psychological assumptions
to be represented in terms of parameter values. The model is made portable
by using the same independent variables employed in the field of research the
modification tries to extend. In this paper we aim to contribute to the PEEMs
approach by introducing some elements of Prospect Theory (PT, Khaneman
and Tversky, 1992) into an otherwise standard general equilibrium overlapping
generations economy with monopolistic competition in the good market (Blan-
chard and Kiyotaki, 1987). This economy is populated by loss averse agents and
characterized by real wage rigidities due to (right to manage or efficient) wage
bargaining, or to efficiency wages. We interpret this addition of PT behavioral
elements to a standard macroeconomic model as a way to analyse the possible
effects of a form of imperfect rationality at the macroeconomic level.
In spite of the early intuitions pioneered by Ackerlof (2002), the considera-
tion of behavioral elements within macroeconomic general equilibrium models
remains a frontier of economic research. The preferential application of PT
to microeconomic or, in any case, to non-general equilibrium contexts hence
severely limits the intellectual background of our endeavour. To the best of our
knowledge, at present there exist only two contributions to the subject matter.
The first one (Gaffeo, Petrella, Pfajfar and Santoro, 2012) inserts PT into a
DSGE New Keynesian model in which households’ utility depends on consump-
tion deviations from a reference level below which loss aversion is displayed
(Koszegi and Rabin, 2006). This creates state-dependent real rigidity and elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption that generate competing
effects on the responses of output and inflation following a monetary shock.
Our experiment is however closer to the second contribution (Ciccarone and
Marchetti, 2013), where reference dependence, declining sensitivity, loss aversion
and narrow framing are introduced into Bénassy’s (1999) analytically tractable
version of Lucas’s (1972) islands model. This makes it possible to show that po-
tential output depends not only on market imperfections, as held since Friedman
(1968), but also on behavioral elements. More in particular, the introduction of
PT into this model: (i) decreases equilibrium labor supply and potential out-
put; (ii) lowers output volatility; (iii) reduces the welfare effects of monetary
policy, measured in terms of agents’ expected utility; (iv) eliminates the para-
doxical improvement in expected utility that may be generated by an increase
in monetary policy uncertainty (Polemarchakis and Weiss, 1977). These results
are brought about by the precautionary behavior of loss averse agents. They
are willing to pay an insurance premium, measured by the loss they accept in
potential output (consumption), against the possibility of deviations of wealth
with respect to its reference amount and they aim at reducing output volatility
as this implies lower wealth variability.
A third paper, although not cast in general equilibrium terms, contributes
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to the intuition which underlies the models we present here. By implement-
ing Shalev’s (2002) theory of symmetric Nash bargaining under PT into the
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) search and matching model, Ciccarone et al.
(2013) show that the asymmetric (Nash) wage bargaining solution can be rein-
terpreted as a symmetric solution with loss averse agents, where the worker’s
bargaining power depends on the relative values of his/her and of the firm’s loss
aversion parameters. When considered together, these contributions show that
PT plays two important roles at the macroeconomic level, as it affects both
the decision process relative to the allocation of consumption and saving (i.e.,
the financial decisions on the level of wealth to be brought to the future), and
the determination of the real wage in an imperfect labour market. Whereas
the results obtained within the Lucas models rely on perfect competition in all
markets, our intuition is that the two effects may go in opposite directions if the
labour market is not competitive. In this case, imperfect rationality may not
necessarily produce negative effects on equilibrium employment and output.
In order to test our intuition, we include PT into a simple and well-known
macroeconomic framework, which we deliberately keep as simple as possible,
also retaining the rational expectations hypothesis. In particular, we focus on
a model in which the unique source of uncertainty is an exogenous monetary
shock to aggregate demand. This assumption allows us to isolate the role of
behavioral elements in the accumulation of wealth, in the spirit of Barberis et
al (2001) who show that PT components in the utility function can affect the
agents’ consumption/saving decisions and hence the economy’s demand side.
Furthermore, as we aim at investigating the implications of PT for the reaction
of firms to nominal/aggregate shocks when setting their prices, we rely on the
assumption on money shocks, which is standard when analysing the causes of
nominal rigidities (see, e.g. Ball and Romer 1990). By so doing we abstract from
sources of real uncertainty in order to ascertain whether PT can have an impact
on the real wage elasticity of output which, in its turn, is a crucial element to
determine firms’ incentive to change (or not to change) nominal prices following
an aggregate demand shock. The main advantage of this simplified framework
is to provide closed form solutions which allow us to precisely evaluate the effect
of loss aversion and monetary volatility on general equilibrium outcomes.
More in particular, we obtain two main results. The first one is that an
increase in workers’ loss aversion produces two effects on equilibrium output.
Under imperfectly competitive labor markets, the wage mark-up depends on
agents’ relative loss aversion parameters. More precisely, the more workers are
loss averse, the lower is the wage mark-up and the smaller is the equilibrium
wage. This wage moderation effect has a positive influence on equilibrium out-
put. On the other hand, by making loss averse agents more cautious, it creates
a saving restraint effect which decreases output. If the former effect is greater
(smaller) than the latter one, then higher loss aversion produces an increase
(decrease) in equilibrium employment and in potential output.
The second result we reach is that imperfect rationality - i.e., the influence
of PT elements on agents’ behavior - can affect nominal price rigidities, a type
of stickiness which has been traditionally justified on the basis of either near
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rationality (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985) or small menu costs (Mankiw, 1985).
Basically, price setters do not change the nominal price in response to a nominal
shock in aggregate demand if this entails a "small" private cost. It is well known
that, in order to obtain such a small cost, a low elasticity of the real wage to a
change in aggregate real production is needed and this, in its turn, requires the
presence of labor market rigidities. In all the cases of labour market frictions we
consider, we obtain an unambiguous result showing that imperfect rationality
(PT) inteacts with the traditional near rationality/small menu costs effect. If
an increase in loss aversion reduces equilibrium output, then the reaction of the
real wage to aggregate demand falls, reducing the private cost of not changing
prices. In this case, an increase in loss aversion enhances the plausibility of
nominal price rigidities.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we describe the model
economy and in section 3 we characterize different types of wage rigidity. The
two main effects produced by imperfect rationality on equilibrium output and
employment are then discussed in section 4. Section 5 addresses the issue of
nominal price rigidity and shows the conditions under which imperfect rational-
ity can favor this type of firms’ behavior. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model economy: consumers and firms
The economy is populated byN identical consumers who can transfer the wealth
produced when young to the next period by accumulating money issued by a
public authority that can alter the money stock period by period. The overall
money supply follows the rule:
Mt = XtMt−1.
where Xt is an aggregate exogenous monetary shock which is assumed to be
unknown to the private agents and log-normally distributed, with xt = lnXt ∼
N

0, σ2x

and with σ2x interpreted as a policy parameter chosen by the authority.
To keep the model as simple as possible, we follow Ciccarone and Marchetti
(2013) and assume that utility is linear in total consumption and labor, and
that (ignoring for notation simplicity any indexing) the representative consumer
living at time t has the biperiodal (expected) utility function:
Et (Ut) = Et (Ct+1)− ψlt + βEt [v (At+1, Aref)] (1)
where C is total consumption (taking place when the agent is old) and ψ rep-
resents the disutility of working a fixed amount of hours. The function lt is
equal to one if the consumer is employed and to zero if unemployed (lt = 0). If
the wage is bargained in the labour market, the number of employed workers
may be chosen either (i) by firms after the wage is bargained through a right
to manage negotiation scheme, or (ii) through an efficient bargaining scheme
(see section 3.1). In a different version of the model (see section 3.2), the term
ψlt is instead reinterpreted as the disutility of effort in a simplified efficiency
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wage framework. In any case, involuntary unemployment is explicitly taken into
account.
At time t the agent cares not only about his/her expected consumption level
Ct+1 per se, but also about his/her expected real financial wealth At+1, as
compared to a reference point Aref. As in Barberis et al. (2001), the parameter
β ≥ 0measures the importance of gains and losses in the utility function relative
to that of consumption per se. The agent is not only loss averse (losses are more
salient than gains), and subject to reference dependence, but also susceptible
to some form of narrow framing: when evaluating financial wealth, he considers
it per se, i.e., independently of the expected utility of the consumption it can
produce at time t+ 1 (Barberis and Wang, 2009).
Denoting with λt the consumer’s demand for money to be carried over to the
next period, the real financial wealth at time t+1 is given by his/her real money
holdings, λt/Pt+1 (where P is the price index) multiplied by the monetary shock
Xt+1. Assuming monetary equilibrium we hence write the level of real wealth
that can be used to purchase consumption when old as:
At+1 =
Xt+1λt
Pt+1
so as to interpret Xt+1 as a stochastic gross rate of return on real wealth. The
reference point Aref is the amount of real asset (money) that would be obtained
if no monetary shock occurred, i.e., Xt+1 = 1, or Mt+1 =Mt:
Aref =
λt
Pt+1
We define the prospect theory (PT) component of the consumer’s utility
function as:
v (Xt+1, λt) =


Xt+1λt
Pt+1
− λtPt+1

for Xt+1λtPt+1 −
λt
Pt+1
≥ 0
−ηh

−

Xt+1λt
Pt+1
− λtPt+1
	
for Xt+1λtPt+1 −
λt
Pt+1
< 0
(2)
where ηh > 1 is the household’s loss aversion parameter. Substituting (2) into
(1) we obtain:
Et (Ut) = Et (Ct+1) + βEt


Xt+1λt
Pt+1
−
λt
Pt+1

for Xt+1≥1
−ηh

−

Xt+1λt
Pt+1
−
λt
Pt+1

for Xt+1<1
− ltψ
The biperiodal budget constraint of the representative consumer is:
Ct+1Pt+1 = λtXt+1 = Xt+1Dt (3)
where:
Dt =Wi,tlt +Rt (1− lt) + Πt (4)
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is the nominal income, Wi,t is the nominal wage of production sector i (see
the next section), Rt is the reservation income accruing to the unemployed. We
assume that profits Πt accrue only to the young generations.
1
In this economy there exist i = 1, 2...I differentiated goods, each of which
is produced by a monopolistic firm setting its price Pi,t. Total consumption at
time t+ 1 is represented by the Dixit-Stiglitz CES aggregator of the individual
goods Ci,t+1:
Ct+1 = I
1
1−θ

i
C
θ−1
θ
i,t+1
 θ
θ−1
(5)
where θ is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods.2
As in Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), the price aggregator is:
Pt+1 =

1
I

i
P 1−θi,t+1
 1
1−θ
The consumer choice problem can be split into two phases. At time t, the
agent determines the overall level of consumption in the following period, Ct+1,
whereas at time t+ 1, knowing the actual value of the nominal stock of money
carried over from the previous period, s/he decides how to split total consump-
tion across the I differentiated goods. The problem tackled by the agent in the
second stage is:
max
Ci,t+1
Ct+1 = I
1
1−θ

i
C
θ−1
θ
i,t+1
 θ
θ−1
s.t :

i
Pi,t+1Ci,t+1 = DtXt+1 = λtXt+1
The solution of this problem provides the individual demand of good i (which
holds at any time t):
Ci,t+1 =

Pi,t+1
Pt+1
−θ
1
I
λtXt+1
Pt+1
1For example, it can be imagined that the old generations donate their shares of firm
property to their young heirs when entering the second period of their life, retaining only the
money carried over from the previous period to be used to purchase consumption goods.
2The assumed linearity of the utility function (1) in both labor and aggregate consumption
does not hence imply that utility is linear in each type of good i, while guaranteeing analitical
tractability and coherence with the original framework of Blanchard and Kyiotaki ([9]). In
their money in utility (MIU) scheme, utility is separable in goods and labor, while the goods
component is a Cobb-Douglas function of C and real money demand. This implies an indirect
utility function which is linear in the agent’s income. In our model the same result is obtained
by replacing the MIU assumption with the linearity in C.
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Summing over households and assuming money market equilibrium (where
Nλt−1Xt =Mt), the total demand of good i at time t, denoted by CTit , writes:
CTit =

Pi,t
Pt
−θ
mt where: mt =
1
I
Mt
Pt
(6)
Firms’ behavior is described in a standard fashion. Sector i monopolist
adopts a Cobb-Douglas technology represented by:
Yi,t = L
α
i,t (7)
where labor Li,t is the only production input. The firm chooses the price Pi,t
so as to maximize real profits:
Πit/Pt = Yit
Pit
Pt
−
Wit
Pt
Lit (8)
under the constraints represented by (6) and (7). The resulting individual price
rule and labor demand are equal to:
Pi,t
Pt
=

θ
θ − 1
1
α

Wit
Pt

m
1
α
−1
t
 α
θ−αθ+α
(9)
Li,t =

θ
θ − 1
1
α

Wit
Pt
− θ
α+θ(1−α)
m
1
α+θ(1−α)
t (10)
3 The model economy: Labor market frictions
We aim to explore the consequences of agents’ loss aversion in a framework where
labor market imperfections can be due to collective bargaining or to efficiency
wages. To this aim, in the next subsection we assume that the total workforce
N is evenly distributed across the I sectoral labor markets. We first analyze
the case in which the wage is determined in all sectors through a symmetric
right to manage (RTM) wage bargaining scheme, and we subsequently explore
the efficient bargaining case. The following subsection derives the effects of loss
aversion under the efficiency wages hypothesis.
3.1 Collective wage bargaining
At each time, the i-th firm and the coalition of that sector’s workers (total
coalitions being in numberNi =
N
I and all being composed by workers belonging
to the young generation), must find and agreement on the level of the nominal
wage.3 Once the wage is set, sectoral employment is unilaterally set by the firm
3As in this phase the parties take the price index Pt as given, by setting the nominal wage
they also fix the real wage.
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on the basis of its labor demand function (10). The choice of the nominal wage
Wit is provided by the solution of the Nash problem:
max
Wit
GUGΠ
s.t.: Li,t =

θ
θ − 1
1
α

Wit
Pt
− θ
α+θ(1−α)
m
1
α+θ(1−α)
t
where GΠ and GU are the utility gains of the firm and of the workers’s coalition,
respectively. As the firms’ status quo value is equal to zero, we can write:
GΠ = Πit/Pt
We assume that the coalition preferences Us are given by the sum of the mem-
bers’ utilities:
Us = Li,tEtU(l=1) + (Ni − Li,t)EtU(l=0)
where EtU(l=1) is the expected utility of an employed member and EtU(l=0) is
that of an unemployed one. The coalition’s status quo utility is then equal to:
Ur = NiEtUt,(l=0)
and the workers’ gain GU writes:
GU = Us − Ur = Li,t

EtUt,(l=1) −EtUt,(l=0)

By using (3) and (4) in the utility function (1), EtUt,(l=1) and EtUt,(l=0) can
be written as:
EtUt,(l=1) =
Wi,t
Pt
Λ− ψ + κ
EtUt,(l=0) =
Rt
Pt
Λ+ κ
where:
Λ = Et

Xt+1Pt
Pt+1

+ βEt

Pt
Pt+1

(Xt+1−1) for Xt+1≥1
−ηh[−(Xt+1−1)] for Xt+1<1

(11)
κ =
Πj
Pt
Λ (12)
We now make the conjecture that the terms κ and Λ are both composed of
constants (i.e., functions of the model parameters or of exogenous variables)
to be determined once the rational expectation of the price level Pt+1 at the
macroeconomic equilibrium is computed. This conjecture will be verified in a
subsequent step.
The Nash bargaining problem is then given by:
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max
Wit

Lit
Wit
Pt
Λ− ψLit − Lit
Rt
Pt
Λ

Pit
P
Lαit −
Wit
Pt
Lit

(13)
s.t. : Li,t =

θ
θ− 1
1
α

Wit
Pt
− θ
α+θ(1−α)
m
1
α+θ(1−α)
t
In order to take into account the possible effects of the agents’ loss aver-
sion on the bargaining process, we follow Ciccarone et al. (2013) and include
into problem (13) Shalev’s [23] theory of Nash bargaining under loss aversion.
According to this analysis, the consideration of a loss component leads to the
replacement of agents’ utilities VU,Π =

=Π for firm
=Us for workers

with:
VU,Π =

vU,Π
vU,Π − ηh,Π

RU,Π − vU,Π
 if: vU,Π ≥ RU,Π
if: vU,Π < RU,Π
(14)
where VU,Π represents the utility of the firm/worker endowed with exogenous
reference points RU,Π and where ηh,Π are the agents’ loss aversion coefficients
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). A new bargaining problem can then be formu-
lated by employing (14). Shalev (2002) shows how to obtain a coherent bargain-
ing solution for the transformed problem that: i) implements the transformation
(14); ii) satisfies all the Nash axioms plus a "representation invariance" axiom;
iii) includes the possibility of endogenous reference points.4 Shalev’s (2002,
theorem 3.2) solution prescribes the following equilibrium sharing rule:
1 + ηΠ
1 + ηh

GΠ
GU
= −
∂GΠ
∂GU
(15)
where GU,Π are the gains defined in the original problem (13) and the term
∂GΠ
∂GU
is the derivative of the Pareto frontier of the set of feasible utility contracts. By
computing this derivative, the sharing rule (15) writes:5
(Wit/Pt)Λ
(Wit/Pt)Λ− ψ −
Rt
Pt
Λ
+ εl,w =
1− φ
φ

(Wit/Pt)Lit
Πit/Pt

where: εl,w =
dLit
d(Wit/Pt)
(Wit/Pt)
Lit
is the labor demand elasticity and:
φ =
1 + ηΠ
2 + ηΠ + ηh
In what follows, we assume that the parameter ηΠ is negligible in comparison
to ηh. By allowing us to retain the firms’ standard profit function, this assump-
tion is coherent with both our focus on the effects of PT components in the
4 In our case, we do not need to describe the endogenous reference.points, as they do not
enter the analytical solution.
5The derivation of the slope of the Pareto frontier, in the Right to Manage model and
in the subsequent case of Efficient Bargaining, makes use of the implicit function theorem
(computations are available upon request).
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consumers/workers preferences and our general strategy to limit the addition of
behavioral elements which modify the standard framework.
By using equations (9) and (10) we obtain a simple sharing rule:
Wit
Pt
= Φ

ψ
Λ
+
Rt
Pt

where: Φ = 1 + φ
1− ζ
ζ
; ζ = α
θ − 1
θ
(16)
As in the standard model with right to manage (RTM) bargaining, Φ can be
interpreted as a wage mark-up which now does not however depend on the
relative bargaining powers of the agents, but rather on their relative loss aversion
coefficient φ. The more workers are loss averse, the lower is φ and the smaller
is the bargained wage.
The determination of the macroeconomic equilibrium wage rule requires to
define the appropriate measure of the reservation income Rt/Pt. We here adopt
the standard assumption that:
Rt
Pt
= but + (1− ut)
Wt
Pt
where b is an unemployment subsidy, exogenously fixed in real terms, ut =
(N − Lt) /Lt is the unemployment rate and Wt/Pt is the average real wage (at
the macroeconomic level). In a symmetric equilibrium, equation (16) leads to
the wage rule:
Wt
Pt
= Φ
b

N−Lt
N

+ ψΛ
1−Φ

Lt
N
 (17)
This rule displays well-known properties (e.g., Layard et al., 1991): it is
always positive and monotonically increasing in Lt.
6 Under the assumption of
a constant Λ, we may then couple (17) with the overall demand for labor (as
determined in a symmetric equilibrium):
Lt = I

1
ζ
W ∗
Pt
− 11−α
(18)
This straightforwardly shows that there exists a unique labour market equilib-
rium at which:
Wt
Pt
∗
>
W
P com
= b+
ψ
Λ

N
N − Lt

; Lt < Lcom
where WP com and Lcom are the real wage and the employment levels under perfect
competition in the goods and labor markets, i.e., when θ → ∞ and φ is set to
0.
An analogous result can be obtained under the assumption that the workers’
coalition and the firm undertake an efficient bargaining. This takes place when,
in each sectoral labor market, they set both the real wage and employment so
6A positive real wage requires that the mark-up Φ is not too high: 1/Φ > Lt/N .
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as to maximize the symmetric Nash product GUGΠ. In this case, Shalev’s ([23])
theory can be integrated in the same way into the bargaining model and the
sharing rule continues so be given by (15), but the slope of the Pareto frontier
is different. By adopting the standard procedure, we obtain that the wage and
employment relationships under symmetric equilibrium are:
Wt
Pt
= Φ
b

N−Lt
N

+ ψΛ
1−ΦLtN
; Lt = I

1
ζΦ
Wt
Pt
− 11−α
(19)
These equations share the main features of the solution generated by standard
models. In particular, the equilibrium level of employment is always lower than
that which would emerge in a competitive labor market (see Appendix 1).
The main conclusion to draw is that under both RTM and efficient bargaining
there exists a unique equilibrium value of Lt. This allows us to verify the initial
conjecture on the value of Λ. Under this conjecture, agents believe that Lt is
a function of the model parameters only. By considering the macroeconomic
equilibrium:
Yt = L
α
t =
XtMt−1
Pt
they hence formulate the following "price theory":
Pt = δXtMt−1 (20)
where δ is an unknown parameter. By substituting the conjecture (20) into
(11), the value of Λ is:
Λ = 1 + βΓ
where:
Γ =
 ∞
1

1−X−1t+1

fXdXt+1 +
 1
0
−ηh

−

1−X−1t+1

fXdXt+1 < 0
and fX is the lognormal distribution function. The sign of Γ is always negative
and its value depends on the variance of the money supply σ2x .
This can be shown through a numerical simulation of Γ and Λ. To this aim
we set ηh = 2.25 in accordance with a wide amount of experimental evidence
(see, e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1992). In the absence of strong priors and
noting that β does not affect the sign of Γ, but only that of Λ, we adopt the
value β = 1 (a unitary financial loss provides the same disutility as a unit of
foregone consumption) and perform robustness checks of our results by changing
the value of this coefficient. Finally, we let σx vary between 0.01 (one standard
deviation) and the value for which Λ = 0 (for greater values of σx, Λ becomes
negative, ruling out economically reasonable solutions). The results of this
numerical exercise are shown in Figure 1:
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Figure 1
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Fig.1. Parameters’ range for model consistency. The figure shows the be-
havior of Γ and Λ for different σx, starting from a value close to 0. The upper
limit of σx, 0.76, is set to the largest value for which Λ ≥ 0.
The intuition for this result hinges on the agents’ attitude towards the pos-
sibility of losses of their real wealth. When formulating their forecasts on the
economy’s evolution, agents know that monetary shocks can induce gains or
losses with respect to their reference wealth. As their rational expectations will
be (on average) fulfilled, they consider this effect when formulating a lower aver-
age demand of consumption as a form of precautionary behavior. The difference
between Λ and 1 (the value obtained when β = 0) may thus be interpreted as an
equilibrium insurance premium to be paid against the possibility of experiencing
deviations of wealth with respect to its reference amount.
The solution we found for Λ fully satisfies the initial conjecture. Actually,
as highlighted in the discussion of equations (17)-(18) and (19), there exists a
unique equilibrium value of aggregate output, Y ∗, under both the RTM and
the efficient bargaining schemes. Being Λ = 1 + βΓ, this equilibrium level
only depends on the model parameters and this ensures that the conjecture
(20) is satisfied with δ = 1/Y ∗. The solution of the rational expectation also
allows us to understand that loss aversion produces two distinct effects on the
macroeconomic equilibrium represented by equations (17)-(18) (RTM), or by
equations (19) (efficient bargaining). An increase in the loss aversion parameter
ηh, on the one side, induces a reduction in Φ and, on the other side, by reducing
Γ, pushes ψ/Λ up.7
7The value for κ can be obtained in a similar way.
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3.2 Efficiency wages
We now wish to explore the macroeconomic consequences of loss aversion in an
economy where labor market imperfections are due to efficiency wages. In order
to make our point as simple as possible, we adopt a simplified version of the
Shapiro and Stiglitz’s ([24]) model based on the idea of efficiency wages as a
discipline device.8
In this set-up, whereas the worker’s income Dj = Wilt + Rt (1− lt) + Πt
and the interpretation of lt as the employment status remain unchanged, we
substitute the term ψlt in the utility function (1) with ψet, where e is the level
of effort provided by the worker, which is here assumed to be either et = 1,
when the worker commits him/herself to the required level of effort, or et = 0,
when the worker shirks. The production function of firm i is then equal to Yit =
(etLit)
α. In order to further simplify the model, we also assume that the firm,
when choosing the optimal incentive scheme for the real wage, is not loss averse.
Under this assumption, the determination of the real wage only requires to
determine the workers’ utility levels in the shirking and in the no-shirking case,
and to assure that the incentive compatibility and the participation constraints
are satisfied.
The utility level of an employed worker providing the amount of effort et = 1
is equal to:9
Ueff = Λ
Wi,t
Pt
− ψ
If the employed worker decides to shirk, s/he enters a lottery: s/he can
be detected, and fired, with probability q, or s/he can avoid detection with
probability (1−q). In line with PT, we assume that s/he evaluates this prospect
in the following way:
Ushir = (1− q) (Ue=0 − Uref) + q [ηh (U (R)− Uref)]
where Ue=0 = Λ
Wi,t
Pt
is the utility level when undetected shirking, U (R) is the
utility of an unemployed worker and Uref is a reference level of utility. We
assume (and show below) that:
Ue=0 − Uref ≥ 0 and U (R)− Uref < 0 (21)
8We do not of course rule out the possibility that other explanations/interpretations of
efficiency wages can be coherent with the presence of loss aversion, as already hinted at by
Akerlof (2002). For example, the fair wage interpretation put forward by Akerlof and Yellen
(1990), which has provided several models bearing important macroeconomic implications
(e.g., Skott, 2005 and Ball and Moffitt, 2002), may prove to be consistent with the presence of
loss averse agents. These models are however dynamic and they tipically use different types
of labor and a relative wage set-up, which makes our point more difficult to propose and to
grasp.
9As we have eliminated the term κ = (Πt/Pt)Λ from indirect utility, by choosing the
appropiate level of Ue=0, Uref and U (R) the final result remains unchanged.
13
The firm must choose the real wage so as to satisfy the incentive compati-
bility constraint:
Ueff − Uref ≥ Ushir →
Wi,t
Pt
≥
ψ
qΛ
+
ηh
Λ
U (R) +
(1− ηh)
Λ
Uref (22)
We now set:
Uref = Λ
Wt
Pt
− ψ;
U (R) = (1− ut)

Λ
Wt
Pt
− ψ

+ ut (Λb)
U (R) = (1− ut) (Uref) + ut (Λb)
where WtPt is the average equilibrium real wage. We hence assume that the
reference level of utility is given by what would accrue to a non shirking worker
in a macroeconomic symmetric equilibrium (notice that, at this stage of the
decision process, the average wage Wt and the individual one Wjt must be
kept distinct, although they will coincide in the overall symmetric equilibrium).
On the other hand, the reservation utility of a generic unemployed worker,
U (R), is given by: (i) the utility of a job for a non shirking worker weighted
by the probability of finding a job (the employment rate 1 − ut) plus (ii) the
utility level Λb obtained if remaining unemployed (with probability equal to the
unemployment rate ut) and receiving the fixed subsidy b. Substituting these
values into equation (22) we derive the wage rule under efficiency wages:
Wt
Pt
=

1 +
1− q
qηh

N
N − Lt

ψ
Λ
+ b (23)
Equation (23) allows us to check that inequalities (21) hold true:
Ue=0 − Uref = ψ > 0 U (R)− Uref < 0→ b <
Wt
Pt
−
ψ
Λ
The competitive limit for (23), computed by assuming perfect monitoring (i.e.,
q = 1) is:
W
P com
=
ψ
Λ
+ b <
Wt
Pt
This result is similar to that obtained in the case of wage bargaining. As the
efficient wage rule (23) implies a real wage which is always greater than the
competitive one, and since firms choose employment according to the aggregate
labor demand (18), a positive level of involuntary equilibrium unemployment
arises. Agents can adopt the same procedure discussed in the wage bargaining
case to determine the value of Λ under rational expectations, which is again
equal to Λ = 1 + βΓ. Furthermore, the position of the wage rule (23) in the
(WtPt , Lt) space continues to depend on the loss aversion coefficient ηh. This
term produces also in this case two distinct impacts on employment and out-
put: a direct one, related to wage determination and operating via the term
(1− q) /qηh, and an indirect one, operating via the term Λ.
10
10The analysis carried out in this section can be replicated under the assumption of a utility
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4 Macroeconomic effects of imperfect rational-
ity
In all the cases considered in the previous section, the overall effect of a change
in loss aversion (ηh) on equilibrium output and employment is ambiguous, de-
pending on the relative size of two counteracting effects. Using eq. (17) we
can compute the reaction of the real wage to an increase in ηh under RTM
bargaining :
d (Wt/Pt)
dηh RTM
=
1
Φ
Wt
Pt
εΦ −
ψ
ΛεΛ
1
Φ −
Lt
N

ηh
(24)
where εΦ =
dΦ
dηh
ηh
Φ < 0 and εΛ =
dΛ
dηh
ηh
Λ < 0 are the elasticities of Φ and
of Λ with respect to ηh.
11 These two elasticities shows how a change in loss
aversion deploys its effects through two different channels. The first one, which
can be dubbed wage moderation effect and is represented by εΦ, operates via a
reduction of the bargained wage in the labor market. The second one, named
savings restraint effect and encapsulated in εΛ, is related to the increase of the
insurance premium related to the allocation of wealth, as a form of precautionary
behavior. The position of the wage rule depends on the relative magnitude of
these two effects. It follows that, as the price rule (18) does not depend on these
two parameters, the influence of loss aversion on equilibrium employment can
be summarized as follows:12
∂Lt
∂ηh RTM
≷ 0 iff:
εΦεΛ
 ≷ Φ ψ/ΛWt/Pt (25)
This shows that a reduction in the real wage leads to an increase in employment
and output if and only if the wage moderation effect prevails on the savings
restraint effect. The opposite occurs when the saving restraint effect dominates.
The same holds under efficient wage bargaining. In this case, the reaction
of employment to an increase in loss aversion is given by:13
dLt
dηh EB
=

ILt
Φ
ηh
 ψ
ΛεΛ −
Lt
N
Wt
Pt
εΦ
(1− α) WtPt +Φ
Lt
N

αWtPt − b
 (26)
function concave in consumption and in the loss aversion component, i.e., when Et (Ut) =
Et

Cχt+1/χ

+ βEt

1
χ (Rt+1−Rr e f )
χ for Xt+1≥1
−ηh

− 1
χ (Rt+1−Rr e f )
χ

for Xt+1<1
− ψlt. In this case, the wage rule
retains the general properties of (23) and, in particular, is monotonically increasing in the real
wage. The conjecture on the equilibrium nominal price can hence be kept unchanged and the
value of Λ can be computed, via an appropriate conjecture on the price level, as seen before.
The function Γ is negative and decreasing in ηh.
This property does not however hold for the wage bargaining framework, in which case the
wage rules (17) and (23) are no longer monotonic in the real wage. This is a well-known
limitation of this class of models.
11Note that the denominator 1
Φ
− Lt
N
must be positive (see eqation (17) - the BRW).
12The inequality directly stems from equation (24).
13 In order to obtain dLt
dηh EB
, differentiate both equations (19) with respect to W/P and L
and solve the resulting system of equations.
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Being the denominator always positive, we can write:
dLt
dηh EB
> 0 iff
εΦεΛ
 > ψ/ΛWt/Pt NLt
As in the RTM case, when ηh goes up employment increases if and only if the
saving restraint effect is smaller than the wage moderation effect.
It is easy to show that the same qualitative conclusion is reached when the
economy is characterized by the presence of efficiency wages. In this case the
reaction of the wage rule (23) to a change in ηh is:
d (Wt/Pt)
dηh E-W
= −
1
ηh

(1 + εΛ)

Wt
Pt
− b

−
ψ
Λ

and hence:14
∂Lt
∂ηh E-W
≷ 0 iff: |εΛ| ≶
1
1 + ηh
q
1−qut
(27)
An increase in Lt following a rise in loss aversion requires the saving restraint
effect to be small enough.
Summing up: in all the wage setting frameworks we have considered, an
increase in output or employment following a rise in loss aversion requires the
saving restraint effect to be small enough. The economic explanation of this
result is straightforward. When formulating their rational expectations, agents
take into account the possibility that monetary shocks affect the real value of
the monetary resources they bring to the next period, and they know that this
induces gains or losses with respect to their reference wealth. The lower average
amount of labour that more loss averse agents optimally decide to supply is
a form of precautionary behavior. The lower consumption that this entails
represents the equilibrium insurance premium they pay against the possibility
of deviations of wealth with respect to its reference amount. This cautious
behavior has a negative impact on equilibrium output. At the same time, more
loss averse workers are willing to accept a lower equilibrium wage, independently
of whether this is set according to RTM, efficient bargaining, or efficiency wages.
This alternative form of cautious behavior has a positive impact on equilibrium
output.
It should be noticed that under perfect competition in the goods and labor
markets (θ →∞, φ = 0 and q = 1) the wage restrain effect disappears but the
saving restraint effect remains, leading to a negative influence of loss aversion on
14As in our efficiency wage framework employment is set by equation (18) alone, it is
sufficient to deteremine the conditions under which an increase in ηh produces an increase in
the real wage W/P . From the wage rule (23) we have:
d (W/P )
dηh E-W
= −
1
ηh
ψ
Λ

1− q
qηhut
+

1 +
1− q
qηhut

εΛ

> 0
which implies: − 1−q
ηhqut+1−q
> εΛ. Being
1−q
qηUut+1−q
> 0 and εΛ < 0, the absolute value of
εΛ must hence be bigger than the (positive) value
1−q
qηUut+1−q
.
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the equilibrium real variables. This effect is interesting per se. It can be thought
of as a specific form of money non-neutrality generated by imperfect rationality:
if we hold ηh constant and consider an increase in monetary variability σ
2
x, the
result is a reduction in Λ which in its turn induces a fall in real output.
Comparative statics with respect to ηh is not the only way to explore the
effects of imperfect rationality in this context. In order to deepen this analysis,
we can also assume an increase in the parameter β ≥ 0, which measures the
importance agents assign to gains/losses relative to that of consumption per se,15
and which produces only a savings effect. It is easy to check that the increase in
β, by decreasing Λ, unambiguously reduces equilibrium employment (and hence
output) under the three wage determination schemes we are considering. In all
these cases, the effect of β is channeled trough an increase in the real wage:
d (Wt/Pt)
dβ RTM-EB
= −
ψΓ
Λ2

1
Φ
−
Lt
N
−1
> 0 →
∂Lt
∂β RTM-EB
< 0
d (Wt/Pt)
dβ E-W
= −
ψΓ
Λ2

1 +
1− q
qηh

N
N − Lt

> 0 →
∂Lt
∂β E-W
< 0
It hence becomes clear that the macroeconomic consequences of loss aversion
depend on the chosen specification of the competitive process in the goods and
labor market. It is worth noting that, contrary to traditional findings, under
imperfect rationality the presence of relevant frictions in these markets can
increase, rather than decrease, the level of potential output.
5 Imperfect rationality and nominal rigidities
The phenomenon of nominal price rigidity has been traditionally explained on
the basis of near rationality (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985), or small menu costs
(Mankiw, 1985). Basically, the choice of not changing the nominal price, Pit,
in response to a nominal shock in aggregate demand (Mt/Pt) may correspond
to a (near) rational behavior if it entails a small cost for the price setter. It
is well known that a small elasticity of the real wage to a change in aggregate
real production, εw,Y =
d(Wt/Pt)
dYt
Yt
(Wt/Pt)
, is required in order to obtain a small
private cost from not adjusting nominal prices. This, in its turn, asks for labor
market real rigidities preventing the wage from quickly and sharply reacting.
In this section we address the question of whether the presence of PT influ-
ences on agents’ behavior - i.e., imperfect rationality - can affect price stickiness.
We tackle the issue by adopting a standard procedure (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985;
Ball and Romer, 1990) and define the individual price setter’s private cost of
not adjusting his/her nominal price Pit as:
Cost∆ =
1
2
∂2Πit
∂p2it

dpit (Yt)
dYt
2
∆2T
15An increase in β can also be interpreted as an increased relevance of narrow framing.
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where pit = Pit/Pt is the agent’s control variable and Yt is real output (real
aggregate demand). Cost∆ is calculated as the individual real revenues lost due
to the failure in adjusting pit after the realization of a nominal shock, represented
by the total change ∆T in aggregate demand. By making use of equations (8)
and (9), we obtain the standard formula:
L∆ =
1
2

1−
1
θ

[1 + α (εw,Y − 1)]
2
α (1− α+ α/θ)
∆2
where L∆ is the private cost, expressed as a percentage of individual real rev-
enues lost due to a failure in adjusting pit, and ∆ is the percentage change of
the single monopolist’s share of aggregate demand (i.e., ∆ = ∆T/Y ).
In order to understand the role played by loss aversion and narrow framing
in fostering or hindering the (near rational) choice of not adjusting Pit, the
derivative of the wage rule elasticity εw,Y with respect to the loss aversion
parameter ηh must be calculated. We do this in the three cases of real wage
rigidity we have considered in this paper.
From equation (17) and taking into account the aggregate supply, Yt =
I

θ
θ−1
1
α
Wt
Pt
− α1−α
, the real wage elasticity under RTM bargaining writes:16
εw,Y =

θ−1
θ α

I
1−α
α Lα−1t − b
α

N
Lt

b+ ψΛ

− b
	 (28)
It follows that its derivative with respect to ηh is:
dεw,Y
dηh
=
ω1εL,η + ω2εΛ
ω3
where:
ω1 = α

N
Lt

ψ
Λ
+ b

− b

Wt
Pt
+

Wt
Pt
−
N
Lt

b+
ψ
Λ

b
ω2 =
N
Lt
ψ
Λ

Wt
Pt
− b

> 0
ω3 = αηh

N
Lt

b+
ψ
Λ

− b
2
> 0
where εL,η =
dLt
dηh
ηh
L is the elasticity of employment with respect to a change in
ηh. From the price rule (18), we write this term as:
εL,η =

1
1− α
 ψ
ΛεΛ −
Wt/Pt
Φ εΦ
Wt
Pt

1
Φ −
Lt
N
 (29)
It can be show that, for reasonable unemployment rates and parameter val-
ues, the sign of the term ω1 is positive
17 (see Appendix 2). This implies that,
16Notice that it is εw,Y > 0 as it is

θ−1
θ
α

I
1−α
α Lα−1t =
Wt
Pt
.
17A minimal condition for ω1 > 0 is
ψ/Λ
b
≥ 1, when the unemployment rate is below 41%.
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being εΛ < 0, the sign of
dεw,Y
dηh
crucially depends on the sign of εL,η. From
equation (29), it is easy to check that this sign is ruled by the ratio between the
elasticities of the two parameters Φ and Λ with respect to ηh, i.e., by the termεΦεΛ  contained in inequality (25).
We can hence state that when an increase in loss aversion ηh reduces the
equilibrium output
 εΛεΦ  > Wt/PtΦψ/Λ , then the reaction of the real wage to aggre-
gate demand (εw,Y ) falls, thus reducing the private cost of not changing nominal
prices (L∆). It follows that when
∂Lt
∂ηh RTM
< 0, an increase in loss aversion also
increases the plausibility of nominal price rigidity. When the effect of ηh on
employment is positive

∂Lt
∂ηh RTM
> 0

, the sign of dεw,Ydηh
is instead uncertain,
even though it is certainly negative if
εL,ηεΛ  < ω2ω1 .
Under efficient bargaining, the elasticity of the wage with respect to a change
in aggregate demand is:
dεw,Y
dηh
= εΦ
εw,Y
ηh
+
ω1εL,η + ω2εΛ
ω3
where employment, the real wage and the ω coefficients are the same as those of
the RTM scheme. As the first of equations (19) guarantees that εw,Y > 0 , we
can confirm the conclusion reached under RTM. As it is reasonable that ω1 > 0,
the sign of dεw,Ydηh
crucially depends on the ratio
 εΛεΦ : if  εΛεΦ  > Wt/PtΦψ/V LtN , an
increase in loss aversion, by decreasing output, also favours nominal rigidity.
As for the efficiency wage scheme, we compute the elasticity εw,Y from the
wage rule: (23):
εw,Y =
1
α

1−
Lt
N
−1
1−
b
Wt/Pt

and then compute the reaction of this elasticity to a change in ηh:
dεw,Y
dηh
=
εL,η
αηh

N − Lt
N
−2 
Lt
N
−

1− α
N − Lt
N

b
Wt/Pt

If the unemployment subsidy is sufficiently small in comparison to the real wage,
or if LN is reasonably high (unemployment is not too high), then the term in
the square brackets is positive18 and the sing of dεw,Ydηh
is ruled by that of εL,η.
This result is qualitatively analogous to that of wage bargaining: if the saving
restraint effect |εΛ| is strong enough, employment falls (εL,η < 0) in response to
an increase in ηh and this eases the condition to obtain nominal price rigidities.
19
18A sufficient condition for this coefficent to be positive is: Lt
Wt
Pt
− bN > 0. As the
equilibium real wage is always greater than the subsidy, this condition is easily verified in
times of low unemployment.
19 It is worth noting that with efficiency wages the sign of the effect of ηh on the private
cost L∆ (via εL,η) is reversed if the unemployment level is sufficiently high.
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The general conclusion that we can draw from the three equations involving
dεw,Y
dηh
under the different wage setting schemes is that the elasticity εw,Y falls
when the saving restraint effect (represented by εΛ) is strong enough, either in
comparison to the wage restraint effect εΦ or by itself (in the case of efficiency
wages). The intuition behind this result can be summarised as follows. For
simplicity, focus on the RTM scheme and rule out the saving restraint effect by
assuming β = 0, so that Λ = 1 and is independent from ηh. In this case we
have dεw,Ydηh
= ω1εL,ηω3 and the elasticity of employment to ηh is unambiguously
positive:
εL,η =

1
1− α

−Wt/PtΦ εΦ
Wt
Pt

1
Φ −
Lt
N
 > 0
Thus it must be dεw,Ydηh
> 0, as long as ω1 > 0. In these circumstances,
the increase in ηh has an impact only on the wage bargaining process: work-
ers/consumers are more cautious in their wage claims. This also means that
the labor market equilibrium is relatively closer to that emerging under perfect
competition. Recall that as long as the labor market is approaching perfect
competition, an increase in aggregate demand tends to generate a substantial
reaction of the real wage.
Now, consider the opposite case in which the wage bargaining process is not
affected at all by the workers’ loss aversion, so that it is φ = 1/2, and β > 0.
In this case the saving restraint effect is active, i.e., Λ is affected by the level of
ηh and an increase in the loss aversion parameter will only translate onto εΛ,
giving rise to:
εL,η =

1
1−α

ψ
ΛεΛ
Wt
Pt

1
Φ −
Lt
N
 < 0
This implies that the elasticity εw,Y must decrease in response to dηh:
dεw,Y
dηh
=
ω1εL,η+ω2εΛ
ω3
< 0. The reason behind this negative response is related to the
utility that workers attach to the real wage. Recall that the utility gain of
the workers is Lit

Wit
Pt
− RtPt

Λ− ψ
	
. If ηh increases and Λ decreases, workers
obtain less utility from the real bargained wage due to the saving restraint effect.
If an aggregate demand shock occurs, both employment and the bargained wage
will change. Yet, with an higher ηh lowering the utility gain from the real wage
(and from being employed), there will be less incentives to change the wage in
the face of a change in output and employment (also because ηh does not affect
the bargaining process per se, via the wage restraint effect). In other words,
the reactivity of the real wage to an increase in demand is lower when ηh is
higher. Clearly, when both the saving restraint and the wage moderation effects
are present, they must be combined in order to determine the final effect of a
change in Y or L on the real wage. If the saving restraint is the prevailing one,
then the reactivity of the real wage to Y will be reduced.
Notice that the same intuition holds for the efficient bargaining scheme and
for the efficiency wage mechanism. In this latter case, we simply need to ac-
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knowledge that the wage moderation effect εΦ is replaced by the role that ηh
plays in enhancing the effectiveness of the monitoring technology via the term
1−q
qηh
in the wage rule (23).
6 Conclusions
By introducing Prospect Theory into a general equilibrium overlapping gen-
erations economy with monopolistic competition in the good market and real
wage rigidities in the labor market we have shown that potential output may
increase or decrease with the strength of agents’ loss aversion. This is due to
the existence of two counteracting effects produced by loss aversion. On the
one hand, the more workers are loss averse, the lower is the wage mark-up, the
smaller is the equilibrium wage and the higher is equilibrium output. On the
other hand, the more agents are loss averse, the more they become cautious in
supplying labor (and consuming when old) and the lower is equilibrium output.
If the wage moderation effect is greater (smaller) than the saving restraint ef-
fect, potential output increases (decreases) with loss aversion. Under perfect
competition in the good and labor markets the former effect disappears but
the latter one remains, leading to a negative influence of loss aversion on the
equilibrium real variables. This shows that, in sharp contrast with traditional
findings, the introduction of imperfect rationality may allow market frictions to
increase, rather than decrease, the level of potential output.
The second important result we have reached is that, in all the cases of labour
market frictions we have considered, when an increase in loss aversion reduces
equilibrium output, then the reaction of the real wage to aggregate demand
falls, thus reducing the private cost of not changing prices and enhancing the
plausibility of nominal price rigidity. This conclusion bears an important policy
implication. If a strong and persistent economic crisis makes agents more loss
averse and if the saving restraint effect happens to be high as compared to wages
moderation effect, unemployment will keep on spiralling upward. At the same
time, the increase in loss aversion, by reducing the private cost of not changing
prices, will favour nominal price rigidities. If the central bank’s main target is
to control inflation, the increased nominal price stickiness will prevent prices to
fall as they “should”, thus preventing the central bank from fully adopting the
necessary expansionary stance. Imperfect rationality would in this way make
monetary policy less expansionary when this would be most needed.
In the light of the encouraging results obtained with the static macroeco-
nomic models we have proposed in this paper, we envisage the next step of our
research project in the construction of a portable extension of DSGE models.
This should be done by incorporating PT into a standard New Keynesian model
with search frictions in the labor market. We are of course aware of the diffi-
culties involved in this endeavour (see, e.g., Grüne and Semmler, 2008), but we
nevertheless believe it is an attempt which is worth to try.
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APPENDIX
1. Efficient bargaining under loss aversion Starting from equations:
W
P
= Φ
ψ
Λ + b

N−L
N

1−Φ LN
; L = I

1
ζΦ
W
P
 1
α−1
(30)
it is easy to show that a unique (and meaningful) solution exists. Equation
W
P = Φ

b

N−L
N

+ ψΛ
	
/

1−Φ LN

is monotonically increasing in L, it has a
positive vertical intercept (W/P = Φb + ψΛ ) for L = 0 and W/P → ∞ when
L → NΦ < N . Equation L = I

1
ζΦ
W
P
	− 11−α
is monotonically decreasing in
the real wage and has the two axes as asymptotes. There must hence exist a
positive couple

W
P EB
;LEB

satisfying both equations with LEB < N . The
competitive real wage (W/P )C obtains from the first of equations (30) with
Φ = 1: WP c = b

N−L
N

+ ψΛ

N
N−L

, and by making use of this value, the price
rule L = I

1
ζ
W
P
− 11−α
allows us to write the equation which determines the
employment level attached to a competitive labor market, Lc:
θ − 1
θ

α
I
Lα−1

1−
L
N

− b

N − L
N

−
ψ
Λ
= 0 (31)
By repeating this procedure for equations (30), with Φ > 1, we obtain:
θ − 1
θ

α
I
Lα−1

1−Φ
L
N

− b

N − L
N

−
ψ
Λ
= 0 (32)
The right hand sides of (31)-(32) can be seen as two functions of employment
L:
y1 =
ζ
I
Lα−1

1−
L
N

− b

N − L
N

−
ψ
Λ
y2 =
ζ
I
Lα−1

1−Φ
Lt
N

− b

N − Lt
N

−
ψ
Λ
In order to check whether the two function y1 and y2 have a positive intersection,
equate them and obtain: y1−y2 → 1−
L
N = 1−Φ
L
N , which is impossible. Hence
the two functions y1 and y2 do not have an intersection in the admissible range
of values of L. The limit values of these y functions are:
lim
L→0
y1 = lim
L→0
y2 = +∞
lim
L→N
y1 = −
ψ
Λ
; lim
L→N
y2 =
ζ
I
Nα−1 (1−Φ)−
ψ
Λ
< lim
L→N
y1
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Furthermore, by direct inspection, both y1 and y2 are monotonically decreasing
in L (dy1,2/dL < 0). This is sufficient to show that the function y2 always
lies above the function y1 in their common graph. The values of L satisfying
equations (31) and (32) must thus respect the inequality: LEB < Lc .
2.Properties of dεY,w/dηh under RTM bargaining Starting from:
ω1 =

N
L

ψ
Λ
+ b

− b

α
W
P
+

W
P
−
N
L

b+
ψ
Λ

b
consider the lowest possible level of the real wage w, which corresponds to the
competitive limit for Φ→ 1:
w =
N

b+ ψV

− bL
N − L
(33)
The bargained wage turns out to be equal to w multiplied by a factor greater
than 1: WP = Φ
N−L
N−ΦLw. Now consider the term
W
P −
N
L

b+ ψΛ

in ω1; as it is:
W
P ≥ w, the following inequality holds:
W
P
−
N
L

b+
ψ
Λ

≥ w −
N
L

b+
ψ
Λ

It must be ascertained that the expression w − NLt

b+ ψΛ

is always positive.
This term is equal to:
N

b+ ψΛ

− bL
N − L  
=w
−
N
L

b+
ψ
Λ

=

1
N
−
1
L

b+

1
N − L
−
1
L

ψ
Λ

N
From equation (33):
1
N
−
1
L

b+

1
N − L
−
1
L

ψ
Λ

N > 0 when
ψ/Λ
b
>
u2
1− 2u
By explicit computation, it is easy to verify that u
2
1−2u is positive and smaller
than 1 for u ∈ [0; 0.41]. It follows that, being the unemployment subsidy
reasonably small, the inequality ψ/Λb >
u2
1−2u is satisfied for reasonable values of
the unemployment rate and the condition ψ/Λb ≥ 1 holds.
This implies that, for reasonable values of the model parameters and of the
unemployment rate, the minimal condition for having ω1 > 0:
W
P
−
N
L

b+
ψ
Λ

> 0
is satisfied.
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